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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for terrorist recruitment
23 results foundAuthor: Olojo, Akinola Title: Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram Summary: Over the past decade, the northern region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites. These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This paper argues that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state. This paper therefore presents the case for a thorough examination of the factors that have inspired public support for Boko Haram and the trajectory of the group's mobilisation of various forms of support in northern Nigeria. This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general difficulty which research in the field of (counter-)terrorism encounters while trying to gather primary source data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zones of conflict. Nevertheless, the author of this paper has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through interviews and research reports. Two central questions at the core of this study include: To what extent do socio-economic issues such as poverty and underdevelopment among youths, the role of religion, and political interests explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram? Second, how can the existing leadership in Nigeria address the escalating crisis; and what role can institutional leadership at the local, national and regional levels play in addressing the problem? One of the theoretical considerations in this paper relates to the structural violence paradigm. Its suggestion of how economic deprivation, class discrimination and societal injustice prevent citizens from reaching their full potential helps to place in context the influence which socio-economic drivers exert on public support for Boko Haram. The awareness that a lack of economic, social and/or political development feeds into the structural factors conducive to terrorism is not new; it already played a prominent role in the first ever resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) on counter-terrorism in 1972 (GA Resolution 3034). In fact, the logic of the structural violence paradigm, as advocated by its chief proponent Johan Galtung, underscores how socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions act as indirect instigators of violence. Individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. The relevance of this can also be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being conceptualised within the framework of human security. As already noted, these issues collectively inform one of the central questions of this study primarily because of its causal link with the crisis context of northern Nigeria. While this is the case, the structural violence approach may very well lose some of its potency when evaluated based on the accounts of other country/conflict settings. Even in the Nigerian situation, and as this paper will further highlight, while structural violence helps to explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram, it nonetheless remains inadequate as a single factor instigating the crisis. Indeed, not every Boko Haram member that has engaged in violence is socio-economically deprived. At the same time, not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of terror perpetrated by the group. Therefore, this study acknowledges that there will always be nuances reflected in varying contexts both within and outside the Nigerian case study. After briefly tracing the course of Boko Haram's emergence as a group, this paper will shed light on the bearing which political and elite interests may have exerted on public support for Boko Haram. Subsequently, the socio-economic context of the crisis will be examined with a view to determining the degree to which it incites public support for Boko Haram. Beyond these issues are other intervening variables that are frequently at play within the Nigerian state. The fifth section will focus on the most important among these, probing the catalytic role of religion and how this has been exploited by the group in generating mass appeal in the north. The sixth part will explore the often assumed external dimension of Boko Haram's activities within the context of weapons, terrorist funding and foreign fighters. The concluding sections will underscore what is instructive about the lessons emerging from the undercurrents of public support for the group, while also reflecting on implications for the development of more robust and concerted counter-terrorism policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 20 p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132671 Keywords: Boko HaramCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsSocioeconomic Conditions TerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Onuoha, Freedom C. Title: Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? Summary: Summary - Since Nigeria's return to democracy in May 1999, armed nonstate groups have significantly undermined the country's internal security environment, largely using young men as foot soldiers. Among these groups, Boko Haram has grown to become a serious national, regional, and international concern. Estimates of the death toll from Boko Haram attacks since 2009 range as high as ten thousand fatalities. With Boko Haram and other groups seemingly gaining in strength, questions arise as to why young men join them in the first place and what the government and other actors can do to prevent it. - Surveys, interviews, and focus groups conducted in Nigeria in 2013 suggest that poverty,unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for activities ranging from errand running to suicide bombings. - To weaken the armed groups' abilities to radicalize and recruit young men, the Nigerian government at all levels, perhaps with support from interested international actors, could institute monitoring and regulation of religious preaching; strengthen education, job training, and job creation programs; design robust programs to aid destitute children; promote peace education; and embark on an anticorruption campaign. Addressing the conditions that make it possible for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 348: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf Shelf Number: 132797 Keywords: At-Risk YouthBoko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist GroupsRadical Groups Terrorist Organizations Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists (Nigeria) |
Author: Benmelech, Efraim Title: What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS? Summary: This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the link between economic, political, and social conditions and the global phenomenon of ISIS foreign fighters. We find that poor economic conditions do not drive participation in ISIS. In contrast, the number of ISIS foreign fighters is positively correlated with a country's GDP per capita and Human Development Index (HDI). In fact, many foreign fighters originate from countries with high levels of economic development, low income inequality, and highly developed political institutions. Other factors that explain the number of ISIS foreign fighters are the size of a country's Muslim population and its ethnic homogeneity. Although we cannot directly determine why people join ISIS, our results suggest that the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS is driven not by economic or political conditions but rather by ideology and the difficulty of assimilation into homogeneous Western countries. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper 22190: Accessed April 25, 2016 at: https://scholars.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/eklor/files/w22190.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://scholars.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/eklor/files/w22190.pdf Shelf Number: 138802 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: Gifts and Graft: How Boko Haram Uses Financial Services for Recruitment and Support Summary: In April 2016, Mercy Corps published a study titled "'Motivations and Empty Promises': Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth," exploring the reasons youth join Boko Haram. In that initial study, we uncovered a number of factors driving support for and recruitment to Boko Haram, including governance grievances and inequality. With support from the Ford Foundation, we conducted this follow-up study to examine in greater depth how inequality drives recruitment, and particularly how Boko Haram uses financial incentives to lure people into the group. We also explored the broader landscape of financial opportunities and barriers to accessing them, with the aim of informing smart policies and programming that address youth needs and help to prevent future participation in violence. Key Findings 1. Boko Haram's financial services provide more than money: they offer the promise of protection and opportunity. Many respondents who accepted financial support and cooperated with the group's demands did so under a protection scheme from Boko Haram. In other cases, community members' desire to improve their financial standing made them receptive to recruitment tactics. 2. Communities see Boko Haram's financial services as more accessible than existing alternatives. Many respondents reported they did not know of viable alternatives to access cash or credit that would allow them to pursue their economic ambitions. They reported that government-provided economic support was not accessible without political connections or bribes. 3. Boko Haram's financial services are used both for recruitment and to gain community support. Respondents reported that Boko Haram used financial support to increase recruitment, achieve tactical aims through local business connections, and broaden popular support. 4. The conditions of Boko Haram's financial support are fluid and unpredictable. While many recipients knew the conditions of their financial assistance at the outset, others did not. Demands could come at any time and without warning and be ideological, tactical, or financial in nature. Recommendations A Increase the quality, availability, and diversity of financial services, particularly to youth with small, informal businesses. In addition to engaging with youth to discuss their financial options and needs, government and private sector financial service providers should expand their products for informal businesses, including micro loans that comply with Islamic financing. A Improve the transparency and accessibility of government-led economic programs. Respondents perceive that government economic development programs are available only to an elite few with money and connections. These programs should be more transparent and accessible for underserved populations and reinforce continued efforts to reduce corruption and address underlying governance grievances. A Expand the role of civil society in developing the Northeast's economic sector. Civil society's role in advocating for equitable economic development and government accountability is crucial to ensuring growth is inclusive and government programs are increasingly transparent. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Gifts_and_Graft_Mercy_Corps_Sept_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Gifts_and_Graft_Mercy_Corps_Sept_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140246 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Institute for Security Studies Title: Mali's Young 'Jihadists': Fuelled by faith or circumstance? Summary: Unemployed, idle and fanatical - this is how young people in the ranks of the armed jihadist groups in Mali are portrayed. However, there is little empirical data to support this characterisation. Little research has been done in the Malian context where the young people involved in these groups have been interviewed directly, to assess the role that both religion and unemployment play in the emergence of this phenomenon that allegedly affects young people the most. Based on interviews with more than 60 previously involved youths, this policy brief questions the conventional wisdom on an important issue that is crucial to stability in Mali and the security of its neighbours. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: ISS, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 89: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/policybrief89-eng.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mali URL: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/policybrief89-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 140260 Keywords: At-Risk YouthJihadistsTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul Summary: This study asked members of the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul to describe the challenges of living in a refugee community, how violent extremists try to exploit their condition for recruitment purposes, and what resources and strategies are needed to minimize their vulnerability. Using ethnographic methods, this study looked at the everyday lives of Somalia-American adolescent boys and young men in the context of their families and communities. It found opportunities for entering violent extremism as well as capacities for diminishing those opportunities. Based on empirical data and informed by relevant theory, it identified themes and built a model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), which can help to inform prevention strategies for building community resilience to violent extremism in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul. No one risk factor explained involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at the peer, family, community, global, state, and societal levels. These risk factors combined to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism with three levels of opportunity: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) contact with recruiters or associates. Involvement in violent extremism depended on the presence of all three, with decreasing proportions of adolescent boys and young men exposed to the latter two. Efforts to increase resilience should involve strengthening protective resources or what are called opportunity-reducing capacities. Furthermore, family and youth, community, and government can help to strengthen protective resources at each of the three levels of opportunity. Priorities include diminishing: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates. Building community resilience to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building. Interventions may involve government, community, and families working collaboratively to improve each other's capacities. Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; and 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection. One way to determine priority areas for prevention might include identifying protective resources with the greatest potential for addressing multiple risk factors. Collaborations between government, community, and families and youth can then be built to enhance these capacities. Based on the current study, promising preventive interventions in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul might include: 1) building a web-based resource that includes information and training about risks and safeguards for use by youth, parents, and community service providers; 2) providing Somali youth and young adults with opportunities for service in their community and humanitarian and peace work, thus creating alternative ways for youth to channel their passion for Somalia; and 3) providing logistical support and training to elders and critical voices in the community and on the web. Additional research is needed in communities under threat to show which acts of building resilience work with whom under what circumstances and why. One way to do this would be to collaborate with the community to develop, pilot, and evaluate a multilevel community resilience-based prevention strategy in Minneapolis-St. Paul based on the DOVE model. Another would be to use the DOVE model as a basis for assessing other communities targeted by violent extremists, in the United States and abroad, so as to refine the model and approaches that can reliably assess communities at risk and help to inform and prioritize prevention strategies Details: College Park, MD: START, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Shelf Number: 146042 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical groupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption Summary: One of the biggest barriers to designing a comprehensive Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme is defining its scope. This paper argues for a narrow approach, focusing on disengagement and the disruption of recruitment. The author develops a simplified model of radicalisation and the concurrent terrorist recruitment process, proposing concrete themes for disruptive intervention and messaging. After analysing case studies of disengagement, the author offers recommendations for specific action to accomplish CVE goals by disrupting recruitment processes and deploying targeted messaging within the framework of the correlated models. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Shelf Number: 146161 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Intergovernmental Authority on Development Title: Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat Summary: Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiiin, Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Horn of Africa, has long been perceived as a Somali organisation – albeit one that represents a security threat to the wider region. But since at least 2010, Al-Shabaab has aspired to become a truly regional organisation, with membership and horizons that transcend national borders. In 2010 the group staged its first major external operation, in Kampala, Uganda, and issued its first propaganda video in the Swahili language. Since then, Al- Shabaab has become active in no less than six countries of the region, striking five of them with terrorist attacks. Al-Shabaab is clearly no longer an exclusively Somali problem, and requires a concerted international response. This determined expansion of Al-Shabaab’s ambitions and operational reach is in large part the result of the strategic direction adopted by Al-Shabaab's former leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and his successor, Ahmed Diiriye, who currently heads the movement. In late 2013, Godane re-organised Al-Shabaab's military wing to include two transnational units: one, the Jaysh Ayman, directed against Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and another dedicated to operations against Ethiopia. While the latter formation has yet to mount an effective operation on Ethiopian soil, the Jaysh Ayman launched a series of cross-border attacks into Kenya in 2014 and, despite a Kenyan counter-offensive in late 2015, the group remains a serious threat to the country's national security. In 2013, Godane also gave instructions for Al-Shabaab’s special operations wing, the Amniyaad, to step up attacks against neighbouring countries, notably those contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This resulted in a spate of attacks between 2013 and 2015 in Kenya that claimed over 350 lives, an attempted suicide bombing of a football match in Addis Ababa in October 2013, and the suicide bombing of a popular restaurant in Djibouti in May 2014. In October 2014, Al-Shabaab again attempted a suicide bombing in Addis Ababa, this time apparently targeting a busy shopping mall, but the plot was detected and foiled. Al-Shabaab-affiliated networks in Kenya also continued to plan terror attacks during this period, but less successfully than Jaysh Ayman. Al-Hijra, Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate, experienced growing pressure from the security services, and suffered a steady attrition of its leadership. As a result, Al-Hijra cadres withdrew from major hubs of activity in Nairobi and Mombasa, dispersing their radicalisation and recruitment efforts throughout the country – notably within the prison system. Al-Hijra operatives and recruits – including a growing proportion of women – continued to travel back and forth to Somalia, typically receiving training and instructions before returning to Kenya to engage in operations. Kenya also witnessed increasing activity among Al-Shabaab sympathisers, organising themselves spontaneously online via social media and mobile applications. While many of these individuals remain purely aspirational, some have gone on to plan operations, reaching out to members of Al-Shabaab or Al-Hijra for guidance and support. Others have sought advice concerning travel to Somalia or Syria. Confronted by the evolving threat, regional states are exploring ways to strengthen their common response to Al-Shabaab. AMISOM, whose forces are drawn mainly from IGAD countries, continues to support the efforts of the Somali Federal Government and emerging federal member states to confront Al-Shabaab militarily, steadily driving the jihadists out of the last remaining strongholds and helping to build the capacity of Somali security forces. Outside Somalia, IGAD Member States have devoted greater efforts to monitoring and disrupting Al-Shabaab activities within their borders. The Heads of Intelligence and Security Services (HISS) of the member countries of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) met twice in 2015 to deepen security cooperation and harmonise efforts to fight terrorism and violent extremism. In August 2015, a two-day experts’ meeting in Djibouti took the first steps towards the establishment of a Centre of Excellence to Counter Violent Extremism for the IGAD region. In addition, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) launched a new Transnational Security Threats (TST) Initiative to promote security cooperation between member states: the initiative under which this report has been commission and published. The report concludes with a series of recommendations for further action, including: • Enhanced security cooperation in countering Al-Shabaab, including a joint review to identify gaps, challenges, and opportunities in strengthening cooperation to combat Al-Shabaab, such as the types of information to be shared and the processes for doing so; more joint activities to confront Al- Shabaab; and inviting Tanzania to participate in any IGAD-led efforts to counter this threat. • Better understanding of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat and possible counter-measures, including appropriate Counter-IED (C-IED) strategies, enhanced technical capabilities for post-blast investigation and analysis, and improved information sharing within the region. • Adaptation to evolving patterns of radicalisation and recruitment, such as the shifting of extremist activities away from former hubs, such as Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, to new geographic areas; sensitisation and training of public officials, in order to help them identify and react appropriately to potential threats; enhance surveillance of terrorism suspects and networks inside the prison system and put in place appropriate responses; and undertake additional research and analysis into current trends of radicalisation and recruitment among young women, in order to formulate appropriate responses. Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Shelf Number: 147782 Keywords: Al-QaedaExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Shelf Number: 141292 Keywords: Boko HaramCitizen AttitudesExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Ewi, Martin Title: Money Talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram Summary: This policy brief is an overview of key findings from a study aimed at understanding violent extremism in northern Nigeria, and identifying factors that are key in Boko Haram recruitment and membership. This analysis contributes to knowledge about the political and socio-economic preferences of the individuals involved in the group. This policy brief highlights one of the major findings of the study, namely the perception that financial incentives, not religion, are a key motivator for individuals who join Boko Haram. Recommendations The following recommendations could assist the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram: 1 Promoting a common Nigerian identity that transcends ethnic, religious and geographic lines by reviewing school curricula and programmes to mainstream national identity. 2 Declare, but don't negotiate the terms of amnesty with Boko Haram: government should declare a blanket amnesty for low- and mid-level Boko Haram militants who may wish to give up arms. 3 Establishing a criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram militants and others who bear the greatest responsibility for the group’s atrocities. 4 Preventing and combating sources of radicalisation by working with local communities and religious leaders to identify strategies for dissuading vulnerable individuals from turning to violent extremism Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Police Brief 98: Accessed march 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Shelf Number: 141293 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Basra, Rajan Title: Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus Summary: About this Study - The presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is neither new nor unprecedented. But with Islamic State and the ongoing mobilisation of European jihadists, the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate. In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals. - The purpose of this report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts. - What we have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus. Radicalisation and Recruitment - The profiles and pathways in our database suggest that the jihadist narrative - as articulated by the Islamic State - is surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and that it can be used to curtail as well as license the continued involvement in crime. - For up to ten of the individuals in our database, we found evidence for what we termed the 'redemption narrative': jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the same personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the 'jump' from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived. - Whether or not jihadist groups are reaching out to criminals as a deliberate strategy remains unclear. Prisons - Fifty-seven per cent of the individuals in our database (45 out of 79 profiles) had been incarcerated prior to their radicalisation, with sentences ranging from one month to over ten years, for various offences from petty to violent crime. More significantly, at least 27 per cent of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 profiles) radicalised there, although the process often continued and intensified after their release. - Our database highlights different ways in which prisons matter: (1) they are places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of 'angry young men' who are 'ripe' for radicalisation; (2) they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for networking and 'skills transfers'; and (3) they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into society. - Given the recent surge in terrorism-related arrests and convictions, and the rapidly expanding number of convicted terrorists in custody, we are convinced that prisons will become more - rather than less - significant as 'breeding grounds' for the jihadist movement. 'Skills Transfers' - There are many 'skills' that terrorists with criminal pasts may have developed. For example, criminals tend to have experience in dealing with law enforcement, and more importantly, may be familiar with the limits of police powers. Criminals are also innovative, and often have an ability to control nerves and handle pressure. - Beyond these, there are three 'skills' which our database provides evidence for: (1) that individuals with a criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; (2) that they are adept at staying 'under the radar' and planning discreet logistics; and (3) that their familiarity with violence lowers their (psychological) threshold for becoming involved in terrorist acts. Financing - The vast majority of terrorist attacks in Europe does not require large sums of money or rely on the largesse of Islamic State's leadership or central command. Whether small-scale or sophisticated, as part of its wider strategy, Islamic State and other jihadist groups are trying to keep financial barriers to entry low, making it possible for all their supporters - no matter how rich or poor - to participate. - Jihadists not only condone the use of 'ordinary' criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging 'jihad' in the 'lands of war'. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice. - Already, up to 40 per cent of terrorist plots in Europe are at least part-financed through 'petty crime', especially drug-dealing, theft, robberies, the sale of counterfeit goods, loan fraud, and burglaries. Based on our database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing. Details: London, United Kingdom : International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Shelf Number: 145139 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsJihadistsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Swedberg, Jeffrey Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa Summary: Based on a review of quantitative and qualitative information and data from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), it can be concluded that USAID-s Niger, Chad and Mali programs have had some positive impact - most strikingly on lower-level programmatic goals such as civic engagement and listenership for USAID-sponsored radio. Results on higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism, were also positive in the aggregate but less dramatic. Despite this empirical evidence of program impact, implementation of the TSTCP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel, indicating a continued need for counter-extremism programming. Background - In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's counterextremism-programming in Africa, focusing on the TSCTP. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant). The Sahel has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State on the TSCTP. The USG's interagency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. USAID implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense. USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad (and in Mauritania until activities were suspended), implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED); and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance. Methodology - The evaluators developed qualitative information (focus groups and key informant interviews) and quantitative data (surveys), and conducted an in-depth review of literature and past reports. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this impact evaluation analyzed survey data to determine if treatment populations in Niger, Chad and Mali, where TSCTP programming was present, had more favorable responses to the survey questionnaire than comparison populations in areas where less TSCTP programming had been present. In all, the evaluators analyzed the results of 1,064 surveys administered in five treatment and four comparison clusters across three countries. The evaluators used the same survey mechanism in both Niger and Chad, and a slightly different version in Mali. The questions for the surveys were chosen from previous questionnaires that had been administered in these countries before, allowing for comparison with baseline data. These - source surveys included the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for Niger and Chad; the Afrobarometer for Mali; and the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey commissioned by AFRICOM for all three countries. The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a -- with the least favorable answer coded as a .... This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale . In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as ―treatment‖ clusters, and -comparison clusters.‖ The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community. Survey Results - While results from this quasi-experimental survey design cannot be considered definitive proof of impact, the findings are consistent with existing literature on the TSTCP. According to the surveys, the program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries. The graphic on the following page (Figure 1) highlights the differences on the survey questions shared in all three countries covered by this evaluation - The differences between treatment and comparison areas, when shown on a one to five scale, are modest - an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters. However, the impact appears mostly consistent across countries. The biggest impact for all three countries came on the survey question regarding whether respondents listen to TSCTP-sponsored peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, data indicates that complementary TSCTP programming, such as governance, youth, micro-enterprise, religious outreach and education, significantly boosts listener-ship. Scores on whether respondents -participate in decision-making - , a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and its predecessor program. The level of - satisfaction with services, -- a key socio-economic indicator, shows marginal but positive results across the countries. The aggregated AFRICOM cultural questions - measuring respondents' views on the degree to which they were against Al Qaeda; against violence in the name of Islam; their opinion of the United States; whether they approved of working with West to combat terrorism; and felt that the U.S. was fighting terrorism not Islam - measure progress on the hardest goals to achieve, and are arguably the most important indicators for demonstrating TSCTP's long-term impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest on the cultural/attitudinal questions. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic TSTCP program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated but less integrated with other USAID programming. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2011. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Shelf Number: 145465 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools: issues and perspectives Summary: Violent radicalization, in and of itself, is not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, movements have called upon their followers to use violence in defence of an ideology or cause, whether for religious, social, political or other motives. However, the current context is one of growing activity by violent radical movements that, although extremely diverse in terms of their ideologies and motivations, all eat away at the Promise of Togetherness and pose a direct threat to our collective security. Quebec has not been spared in the emergence and proliferation of radicalization leading to violence, which is how it came about that in 2015 several young Quebecers left for Syria to join extremist groups on the ground there. College de Maisonneuve has been hit especially hard by this state of affairs; it was at the instigation of the college that the CPRLV undertook the present study to document the situation, produce a cross-sectional analysis and propose recommandations. The report explores the following broad topics: - Explaining radicalization leading to violence linked to jihadism and the situation in Syria - Placing Quebec in context with regard to this phenomenon - Understanding the radicalization of some students from College de Maisonneuve and other young people receiving counselling from the CPRLV - Identifying strategies for preventing radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools. The different recommendations generated by this analysis (and presented at the end of the rapport) are directed not only at College de Maisonneuve, schools and government agencies but also at ordinary citizens affected by the question who would like to engage in a helpful and proactive manner with those around them. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2017 at: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Shelf Number: 145633 Keywords: ExtremismRadical ExtremistRadical GroupsRadicalizationSchoolsTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander Title: Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review, 2006-2016 Summary: This literature review seeks to recalibrate our understanding of online radicalisation, hiw it is conceptualised within the literature and the extent to which the policy debate has advanced in response to technological and legal developments. Details: Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ResearchPerspectivesonOnlineRadicalisation.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ4985_Lit_Review_020517_final_web.pdf Shelf Number: 145639 Keywords: Online RadicalizationRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Title: Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers Summary: Over the past years, the number of reported attacks perpetrated by violent extremist groups has risen. As we witness tragedies on all continents, we understand that violent extremism knows no boundaries and affects every society. Young people are, however, most at risk. They are the main targets of recruitment strategies and fall victim to extremist violence. This phenomenon alerts us to the risk of losing a generation of youth to despair and disengagement. In the face of such threats, there is no single solution. Security responses are important, but not sufficient, and will not tackle the many underlying conditions that breed violent extremism and drive youth to join violent extremist groups. We need soft power, such as education. In particular, we need relevant, inclusive and equitable quality education. This is the sine qua non to effective action and requires countries to simultaneously implement short, medium and long-term responses. To assist countries in their efforts, UNESCO has developed this publication Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers. The Guide also responds to the decision of UNESCO's Executive Board at its 197th session (197 EX/Dec46) through which Member States acknowledged the importance of preventing violent extremism through education and requested that UNESCO assist them in this endeavour. Together with the Teachers' Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism produced by UNESCO, this Guide offers technical guidance for education professionals (policy-makers, teachers and various education stakeholders) on how to address the concrete challenges posed by violent extremism within each society. The Guide particularly aims to help policy-makers within ministries of education to prioritize, plan and implement effective preventive actions. Details: Paris: UNESCO, 2017. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Shelf Number: 145803 Keywords: Crime PreventionEducational ProgramsExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorist RecruitmentViolence PreventionViolent Extremism |
Author: Gaub, Florence Title: The Crime-Terrorism Nexus Summary: That there is a link between terrorism and crime is common knowledge: terrorism itself is a crime, often funded by organised criminal activity. But in the case of Daesh, the link goes much further. The organisation recruits more former criminals, and funds itself more through petty - not organised - criminal activities than other groups. Yet this also offers law enforcement officials an opportunity to pursue it from another angle beyond the usual radicalisation narrative. This requires a zeroing in on hitherto neglected petty criminals, however. Details: Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Brief Issue no. 10: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 145827 Keywords: Financing TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Bondokji, Neven Title: Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers Summary: Interest in the drivers of, and models to explain, the processes of radicalisation has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Attention has focused on the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region due to the expansion and reach of armed radical groups, manifesting in acts of violence both domestically and aboard. Within the radicalisation debate, scholars and practitioners have wrestled to understand the ideologies that inspire the members of self-described 'Islamic' armed groups and other causal drivers, be they social, economic, or reactionary. While this has contributed to a diversity of literature on violent radicalism, terrorism, and extremism, there is little academic consensus let alone empirical studies to validate existing theories. This paper seeks to synthesise current knowledge on the drivers of radicalisation. It examines literature on radicalisation in the WANA region, Western states, Central Asia, and Africa. Because the aim is to understand these phenomena in relation to those joining Daesh (also known as ISIS, IS, ISIL), al-Nusra (generally considered al-Qaeda's Syrian branch), and their affiliates, the analysis focuses on radicalisation at the level of the individual, not radical organisations. The paper is divided into six sections. The first defines radicalisation. The second and third sections discuss the typologies of radicals and extant radicalisation models with particular emphasis on the factors that affect individuals. The fourth section examines the literature on political, socio-economic, social, and cultural drivers of radicalisation. It then identifies knowledge gaps and weaknesses in the existing literature, and makes suggestions on the development of a more reliable empirical evidence base on violent radicalisation. The principal findings are that radicalisation is a personal process that starts with grievances and perceived injustices concerning political or social contexts, the subsequent identity crisis and, lastly, the search for purpose that follows. Moreover, radicalisation should be understood in the context of 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such factors include those of a political, economic, and ideological nature, as well as psycho-social drivers, such as a search for adventure, status, and belonging. Radicalisation also develops within supporting social environments that include family influence and narratives of victimhood. These insights are important for the development of targeted and workable policy interventions to counter the growth of violent extremism. However greater empirical evidence is necessary, particularly geared towards capturing the family dynamics at work in the radicalisation process, the role of women and female preachers, the causal relations between single factors, and driver confluence. The key challenge is limited access to radical individuals and those who have participated in violence. Until this can be overcome, a comprehensive understanding of their motives will be difficult, thus limiting the development of effective policies and programs to counter violent extremism. Details: Amman, Jordan: WANA Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145934 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Veenkamp, Ivo Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Program and policy approaches relating to youth through education, families and communities Summary: The focus of international and national strategies for countering terrorism in the past decade has shifted from using hard security measures alone to combat terrorism, to a more multi-sectoral, comprehensive approach, which also includes more preventive strategies known as countering violent extremism (CVE). For example, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations are focusing on CVE through Pillar 1 of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which addresses "conditions conducive" to the spread of terrorism. This relatively new approach is also apparent through the formation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) as a multilateral platform for addressing counter-terrorism issues, and the subsequent establishment of Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, as the first institution to solely focus its efforts in long-term, preventive measures to foster resilience against violent extremism and terrorism. The CVE programs and policies that are emerging both out of the UN, the GCTF, Hedayah and the broader international community are based on an established basic methodology that 1) identifies push and pull factors that lead to recruitment or radicalization into violent extremism, and 2) designs interventions that specifically eliminate these root causes. This paper explores the international framework supporting the development and implementation of targeted interventions, specifically to minimize youth recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism through two program areas: 1) CVE through formal educational institutions, 2) building community resilience through families and communities. This paper also describes the recent work by Hedayah and other international bodies in these two program areas, and recommends potential next steps and ways forward to make these programs more effective. Details: Unpublished paper, 2014. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/D._INEE_Round_Table_Background_Reading__FINAL_Veenkamp_Zeiger_Youth_CVE_NATO_ARW.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/D._INEE_Round_Table_Background_Reading__FINAL_Veenkamp_Zeiger_Youth_CVE_NATO_ARW.pdf Shelf Number: 145951 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Countering Violent Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Teich, Sarah Title: Islamic Radicalization in Belgium Summary: Belgium has become a major hotbed for radicalization in Europe. At least 380 Belgians have travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, giving Belgium the largest number of jihadists per capita at 33.9 fighters per one million residents. Radicalized Belgian Muslims are significantly involved not only in terrorist attacks in Belgium, but throughout Europe. What has caused Belgium to become this fertile a ground for Islamic radicalization? This paper points to the low levels of employment, high levels of discrimination, low educational achievement, poor integration, and inconsistent governmental funding pervasive among the Belgian Muslim community. These poor demographic realities of the Belgian Muslim community might be significant in providing a fertile ground for radical Islamic parties and organizations to influence and recruit. This paper analyzes Islamic radicalization in Belgium. The first part of this paper examines Belgian-Muslim demographics, including population, integration, political participation, and organization. Then, Belgian Islamic radicalization is examined through the theoretical frameworks of both McCauley and Moskalenko and Social Movement Theory. To conclude, this paper considers governmental responses and recommendations for future preventative actions. Details: Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Shelf Number: 146257 Keywords: MuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: United Nations Development Programme Title: Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment Summary: The expanding reach and destructive consequences of violent extremism are among the major challenges to peace faced in today's world. In Africa, 33,300 fatalities are estimated to have been caused by extremism between 2011 and 2016, with related displacement and economic devastation contributing to among the worst humanitarian catastrophes ever seen on the continent. Violent extremism is also posing a direct and manifest challenge to the gains enjoyed by many countries over recent years, and threatens to stunt development outcomes for generations to come if left unchecked. The steep rise in violent extremist activity in Africa represents a significant threat to global security and development overall. Development actors are uniquely placed within the overall response architecture for tackling violent extremism, and have an integral role to play in averting the threats posed by preventing and transforming it. Development expertise and resourcing can be leveraged to address structural drivers; to support communities in implementing deradicalization initiatives; and to help ensure that former members of violent extremist organizations are socio-economically reintegrated, among many other critical areas, many of which are explored in this report. Many partners are already taking up the challenge with new programmes and initiatives, and wide-ranging Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) interventions. However, the question remains open as to how to most effectively respond. Collective reflection is needed on lessons that emerge from past and present interventions - not only on the development side, but also across the mainstream of counter-terrorism. To date, overall success is mixed at best, as insecurity continues to deepen. The challenges also demand a closer nexus between the security and development arms of government, and more integrated ways of working than has yet been achieved. UNDP is leveraging its own long-established presence, partnerships and expertise to contribute to preventing the threat of violent extremist expansion across Africa. In 2015, we developed a bold Africa-wide initiative, Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach, which works with national governments and stakeholders, regional institutions, faithbased institutions, civil society and many others to augment PVE interventions while also striving to contribute new understanding and knowledge. Through this programme, we are supporting national and regional partners to develop new strategic responses that strike at the core of the conditions that are conducive to violent extremism. At the same time, we are working in other areas, such as in assisting religious leaders to develop curricula for the governance of religious institutions, and building bridges between security actors and communities to reduce distrust and mutual suspicion. We know the drivers and enablers of violent extremism are multiple, complex and context-specific, while having religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. They defy easy analysis, and understanding of the phenomenon remains incomplete. Undertaken as part of the UNDP Africa PVE programme, the Journey to Extremism in Africa study has been a complex two-year intervention explicitly designed to respond to knowledge and evidence gaps - building on our earlier work exploring perceptions on radicalization, violence and insecurity in the Sahel. Specifically, it aims to generate improved understanding about the incentives and drivers of violent extremism, as expressed by recruits to the continent's deadliest groups themselves. Our team has travelled to remote areas of Africa to conduct the largest ever number of interviews with individuals who have been recruited by violent extremist groups. Our intention has been to develop a picture of the typical 'journey map' to violent extremism: from childhood, through to the 'tipping point' for recruitment, and even on to demobilization. We have drawn on our expertise from across the organization to interpret the resulting dataset, and to identify where development actions can help build resilience. Details: New York: UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa, 2017. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2017 at: http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf?download Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf?download Shelf Number: 147497 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorist RecruitmentTerrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System Summary: In the past few years, the international community has been increasingly confronted with the recruitment and exploitation of children by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Numerous reports have shed some light on the extent of this disturbing phenomenon. Estimates indicate that, since 2009, about 8,000 children have been recruited and used by Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to a report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, some boys have been forced to attack their own families to demonstrate loyalty to Boko Haram, while girls have been forced to marry, clean, cook and carry equipment and weapons. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights received consistent reports that some boys and girls were increasingly being used as human shields and to detonate bombs. In May 2015, for example, a girl about 12 years old was used to detonate a bomb at a bus station in Damaturu, Yobe State, killing seven people. Similar incidents were reported in Cameroon and the Niger. During attacks by Boko Haram, abducted boys were used to identify those who refused to join the group, as well as unmarried women and girls. In 2015 alone, the United Nations verified 274 cases of children having been recruited by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations verified the existence of centres in rural Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and rural Raqqah that provided military training to at least 124 boys between 10 and 15 years of age. Verification of the use of children as foreign fighters has increased significantly, with 18 cases involving children as young as 7 years of age. The use of children as child executioners was reported and appeared in video footage. In Iraq, in two incidents in June and September 2015, more than 1,000 children were reportedly abducted by ISIL from Mosul district. While the lack of access to areas in conflict undercuts the possibility to gather precise data, it is known that recruited children were used to act as spies and scouts, to transport military supplies and equipment, to conduct patrols, to man checkpoints, to videotape attacks for propaganda purposes and to plant explosive devices, as well as to actively engage in attacks or combat situations. These figures are likely to be significant underestimates because of the limited opportunities to gain access and monitor violations against children. Child recruitment is also perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia,5 by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar Eddine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and neighbouring countries and by the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, to name a few. Owing to the expanding reach and propaganda of terrorist and violent extremist groups, child recruitment and exploitation are in no way limited to conflict-ridden areas. More and more children are travelling from their State of residence to areas controlled by terrorist and violent extremist groups, in order to join them. They may travel with their families or by themselves, and obtaining comprehensive data on their participation in hostilities is often difficult. In the case of ISIL, for instance, information often becomes available only after the children's death, when they are eulogized as martyrs and their country of origin is revealed. Data collected for more than one year, during the period 2015-2016, concerned 89 children who died in hostilities. They included not only nationals of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, but also nationals of Australia, France, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Yemen. These figures do not include children taken to ISIL territory by their families. Finally, children may also be recruited to support the groups, or even carry out attacks, in countries that are not experiencing armed conflict. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Shelf Number: 148961 Keywords: Child ExploitationChild ProtectionExtremist GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Radicalising Our Children: An Analysis of Family Court Cases of British Children at Risk of Radicalisation, 2013-2018 Summary: At least 156 children have been involved in family court cases in which concerns over extremism or radicalisation have been cited, according to a new study released by the Henry Jackson Society. Of the cases examined, the think tank found that 48% of families had one family member or more who joined IS. Nikita Malik, Director of the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism and the report's author, today warns that the UK's courts are not currently up to the task of handling a wave of women who joined the 'caliphate' returning with their children. The report concludes that the family court is frequently powerless to take steps to protect the welfare of children, even when the counter-terrorism division is aware that parents involved are often terrorists with extremist mindsets. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile, welcomed the report, and stated it is "apparent that the family court is not always able to take the appropriate steps to protect" the children of extremists. Meanwhile, Tim Loughton MP, the former Children's Minister, stressed that the Family Courts require "better protocols, guidance and support" to deal with this "increasingly urgent part of their role". Contrary to claims the girls of Islamic State were vulnerable brides, the report finds that, far more so than boys, girls who travel to the 'caliphate' made their own decisions. The author concludes that boys tended to join Islamic State under the influence of their families, whereas girls were more active and independent in seeking out extremist material - often online. All of the girls in cases analysed by the study who had self-radicalised were motivated in part by the possibility of marriage to a person of their choice. The study, which qualitatively analyses the 20 cases with the most comprehensive court records over recent years, also found that: 55% of cases had links to Al-Muhajiroun, the banned group founded by Anjem Choudary. 67% of families had a history of domestic abuse or a history of wider criminal conduct. Almost 20% of the children involved were home-schooled; while, 38% families contained children absent from school. In cases where gender was known, 64% of children involved in court actions were boys. The report calls for a bespoke set of powers for judges to use in cases of extremism involving children. Citing the high burden of proof required for the more traditional option of care orders, the report argues that the powers imbued with wardship have proved more suitable in many cases, to meet the growing and pertinent challenge of countering radicalisation. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2019. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Shelf Number: 154812 Keywords: At-Risk YouthExtremismIslamic StateRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Title: Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools Summary: High school students are ideal targets for recruitment by violent extremists seeking support for their radical ideologies, foreign fighter networks, or conducting acts of targeted violence within our borders. High schools must remain vigilant in educating their students about catalysts that drive violent extremism and the potential consequences of embracing extremist beliefs. Details: Washington, DC: FBI, Office of Partner Engagement, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2019 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf Shelf Number: 156419 Keywords: Extremism Radicalization School-Based Programs Terrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |